Crimean Assessment: NATO discovers the new Russian army
At the discretion of the BAO block, there was “invasion” of Crimea by the Russian army, or rather “incursion” (this is the word in vogue, and BHO has even used the word “excursion”). In this context agreed as a hypothesis to better develop our analysis, it is interesting to hear the appreciation of the military leaders of NATO. It is the supreme commander of NATO (SACEUR), general of the USAF Breedlove, who instructed the Brussel’s Forum, very Orthodox Assembly annual Atlanticist organized by the German Marshall Fund, this weekend in Brussels. (Extracts below, see the Wall Street Journal on March 23, 2014.)
• Breedlove was very impressed, both by the preparation of the “incursion”, under cover of maneuvers allowed by security agreements, by its execution. “” We saw several snap exercises in executed which broad training of forces were brought to readiness and exercised and then they stood down, “ [Breedlove]“ said. “”“And then… boom-into Crimea with a highly ready, highly prepared force,” he said.[...]
»The general said it was clear that Russia had significantly improved its capabilities since the 2008 Georgia war. “The incursion of Russia into Georgia… was probably not the smoothest,” he said. “By way of comparison, the foray into Crimea went very much like clockwork, starting with almost a complete disconnection of the Crimean forces from their command and control via jamming and cyberattacks and then a complete envelopment by the Russian forces inside of Crimea.”»
• Breedlove remained constantly in contact with his counterpart ruse, general Gerasimov, Chief of general staff. The one and the other are are kept informed of the situation and Breedlove recognizes that it cannot determine if these interviews it were misled about Russian intentions at one time or another- but in any case it intends to pursue them… It is a strange situation because combining cooperation and antagonism, – cooperation because the issue is too important, between two nuclear powers of this size, and antagonism because committed operations are actually antagonistic: Breedlove “… defended the contacts he has developed with his Russian counterpart General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff. ” He said he would seek to maintain it in future. NATO had been trying to improve high-level contacts with Russian military officials in recent months and the alliance said the two men spoke Feb. 24, right after the Crimea crisis started. They agreed to “keep one another informed” about the situation, NATO said at the time. “Was I being deceived?” Gen. Breedlove said Sunday. “I can’t make that judgment. “I don’t know when and how his leadership made the decisions that they made.”»
• Breedlove believes that the Russians use the pressure of their armed forces to consider “incursions” in certain situations of frozen conflicts, to discourage projects entry into NATO of some countries on the borders of the Russia. They blend well in a remarkable way the use soft (the communication system, with the effect of pressure) of hard power (System of Technologism, with the handling of their armed forces) for essentially political results, much more than military. “Gen. Breedlove said he is concerned about Russian forces sitting on the Ukraine border crossing southern Ukraine into Transnistria, a breakaway pro-Russian province in Moldova. Moscow, he warned, appeared to be actively using frozen conflicts in its neighborhood like Transnistria and Abkhazia in Georgia as a way of vetoing neighbors’ push for deeper ties with EU and NATO.
»“In other words, if Russia is worried about a country moving toward the West, a way to solve that is an incursion, a frozen conflict and now, no. one wants to think about bringing that nation aboard into NATO because it might mean conflict with Russia that are very worrisome,” he said.»
Breedlove has long assured his audience that NATO would work a substantial redeployment of its forces on the basis of the new situation and, most importantly, capacity-building and new tactics put in evidence by the Russian army. Despite l ‘ assurance shown by SACEUR in that register reflected mainly the public relationship, it appears that the Russian Crimea behavior, mixing with skill, flexibility and extreme coordination soft power and the hard power of military forces, without tanks petaradants in clouds of smoke or cliquetantes caterpillars, poses a problem new and very sensitive to the Alliance. This problem is simply this, under the US leadership that follows blindly designs made of classification of zones according to a rigid ideological vision, NATO has developed new capabilities for the new type of war postmodern (or 4GW for “fourth generation warfare”) for external operations, “off-zone”, judging the “NATO zone” (and the Russia) “under control”. The problem of NATO capabilities and Russian designs, it is highlighting this area supposedly “under control” is not at all and is also capable of completely new techniques and tactics. However, this area is intrinsically fundamental importance from a strategic point of view certainly, but even more of a unique importance as the ultimate confrontation between the system and the anti-skid system resistance
An another account (directly), giving another aspect of the intervention of Breedlove and other interventions in the forum, is particularly oriented to highlight this issue of military capabilities and their proper use in the type of crisis more and more new, postmodern, characterized by organized disorders and other spontaneous, and a general and political situation fluid and marked by the omnipotence of the communication system. The psychological action with the opponent, even if not directly involved, also plays a big role; It’s what Breedlove called “strategic ambiguity” (the Russians during the Crimean crisis) Recalling the famous technique known as the maskirovska of the Red Army (see August 13, 2002), used various successfully during the cold war, whose spirit is much better suited to the current postmodern situation, where triumph the communication system, with its mock, its narrative, etc.
«Breedlove [...] said that there was little doubt that Russia had anticipated action in Crimea for some time. “Part of the plan I believe was to create strategic ambiguity,” he said. “Russia tried to get a local face in Crimea with local militias, but there was a thin veneer of locals in the front and a lot of men in green behind,” he continued, referring to Russian troops in unmarked uniforms. [...]
»A later session on the differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power illuminated different approaches to conflicts between state and even non – state actors. Gitte Lillelund Bech, public affairs manager at Advice and former Danish defence minister, said that the military is changing what it sees as its role. “The military doesn’t just think of itself as hard power,” she said. “They do development and diplomacy too.” General John Allen, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution and former allied commander in Afghanistan, agreed that the use of hard power alone is not sustainable. “The soft power application of resources takes the enemy off the battlefield and reduces the hard power we have to face.”»
The General comment that can be drawn from these some observations and confidences is that NATO leaders are extremely surprised by manoeuvring capabilities, mobility, discipline and discretion of action by Russian forces. Without a doubt, this is a new element of considerable importance for the military and experts of block BAO, hitherto inclined to treat with contempt the Russian armed forces.It is an accurate indication that the reform of the Russian army which began in recent years, and still ongoing, has borne fruit, and that it goes much further than the simple aspects technique, material and structure of the forces, it is also on psychological concepts and communication with a political vision taking into account the dimensions of deep fundamental characters analysisincluding characters of the order of mind, characterizing our metahistorique time. “Excursion” or not (in the Crimea), it is good that the system leaders are convinced of this evolution, which complicates the analysis of the situation, both from the point of view of the balance of forces, their use, that the dimension of communication with its effects on the psychology. Suddenly, the European situation appears in their eyes much less stable in its dynamic orientation, until then characterized by the triumphant perception of evolution one-way to the weakening and isolation of Russia until the final defeat (the rude “after Kiev, Moscow” McCain, characteristic of mind locked in a binary vision of the world [see March 15, 2014 )]).